The announcement that the U.S. Navy might lead an international coalition to escort commercial vessels through the Strait of Hormuz sounds like leadership. In reality, it is a desperate attempt to apply 19th-century naval doctrine to 21st-century asymmetric chaos. Scott Bessent and the current policy hawks are pitching a "coalition of the willing" as a stabilizer for global energy markets. They are wrong. They are miscalculating the physics of modern naval warfare and the brutal math of the global insurance industry.
Escorts do not provide security. They provide a bigger target.
When a guided-missile destroyer sits alongside a Suezmax tanker, it isn't "securing" the lane. It is anchoring a multi-billion dollar asset in a geography where the cost of offense is roughly 0.01% of the cost of defense. We are talking about a body of water that is 21 miles wide at its narrowest point. If you think a carrier strike group or a few frigates can create a "safe zone" in a literal bathtub filled with shore-based anti-ship missiles and $20,000 suicide drones, you haven't been paying attention to the Black Sea or the Red Sea.
The Myth of the "International Shield"
The competitor narrative suggests that international cooperation distributes the burden and provides a unified front. This is a bureaucratic fantasy. In practice, international naval coalitions are a command-and-control nightmare. Rules of Engagement (ROE) vary by country. One nation’s frigate might be authorized to fire on a drone swarm; another might be legally bound to wait until a hull is breached.
This creates "seams" in the defense. Adversaries do not attack the strongest point of the escort; they find the ally with the most restrictive ROE and exploit it. I have seen military planners lose their minds trying to synchronize these "coalitions" in simulated wargames. The result is always the same: a fragmented response that fails the moment the first saturation attack begins.
Beyond the tactical failure, there is the economic reality. The U.S. taxpayer is effectively subsidizing the profit margins of global shipping conglomerates and foreign energy consumers. If the Strait is "vital" to the world, why is the U.S. providing the bulk of the kinetic muscle?
The Arithmetic of Attrition
Let's talk about the math that the "escort" advocates refuse to acknowledge.
A standard SM-2 interceptor costs roughly $2 million. An Iranian-made Shahed-style drone or a repurposed ballistic missile costs anywhere from $10,000 to $50,000.
Imagine a scenario where an adversary launches a saturation attack of 50 drones and 10 low-cost cruise missiles.
- Cost to Attacker: ~$1.5 million.
- Cost to Defender: ~$120 million in interceptors, plus the wear and tear on Aegis systems.
This is not a sustainable defense strategy. It is an invitation to bankruptcy. By committing to an escort mission, the Navy is agreeing to play a game of catch where the other side has an infinite supply of balls and we have a finite, wildly expensive glove.
Furthermore, the "escort" assumes the threat is only at sea. It ignores the fact that modern anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs) can be launched from mobile trucks hidden in coastal mountains. You cannot "escort" a tanker past a threat that is invisible until three minutes before impact.
Shipping Insurance is the Real Commander
The people calling for naval escorts think the U.S. Navy controls the flow of oil. They don't. The Joint War Committee (JWC) in London and the maritime insurance underwriters do.
When the U.S. Navy moves in, insurance premiums don't necessarily drop. Often, they skyrocket. Why? Because the presence of a military escort signals that the area is an active combat zone. Underwriters at Lloyd’s of London aren't comforted by a destroyer; they see a "War Risk" surcharge.
If a tanker is hit while under U.S. protection, the reputational damage to the Navy is catastrophic, but the financial damage to the global economy is worse. The moment a "protected" ship sinks, the Strait effectively closes. No captain is going to sail into a "safe" lane where the protector just failed.
The industry is asking the wrong question. They ask: "How do we protect the ships?"
The real question is: "How do we make the Strait irrelevant?"
The "Hormuz Dilemma" is a Policy Choice
We are obsessed with the Strait of Hormuz because we have failed to build redundant infrastructure. The East-West Pipeline in Saudi Arabia and the Abu Dhabi Crude Oil Pipeline are underutilized. Instead of spending billions on naval fuel, maintenance, and munitions to circle the Persian Gulf, that capital should be diverted into land-based bypasses.
But bypasses aren't "bold." They don't make for good campaign speeches about "showing strength."
The hard truth is that an escort mission is a signal of weakness. It admits that we are hostage to a 21-mile wide strip of water. It tells the world that the U.S. military is now a high-priced security guard for commodity traders.
Why "Coalition" is Code for "U.S. Only"
Let's stop pretending this will be a balanced international effort. History shows that when the shooting starts, most "coalition" partners find a reason to be elsewhere or limit their involvement to "humanitarian support."
The U.S. Navy is currently overstretched, facing recruitment crises and a shrinking fleet. Committing a significant portion of the 5th Fleet to babysit tankers is a strategic gift to competitors in the Indo-Pacific. Every destroyer burning circles in the Gulf is a destroyer that isn't in the South China Sea.
We are trading our long-term strategic positioning for a short-term, cosmetic fix for oil prices.
The Unconventional Solution
If you want to secure the Strait, you don't use ships. You use transparency and financial warfare.
- Massive Drone Surveillance: Not for defense, but for attribution. If every square inch of the Strait is under 24/7 unblinking surveillance, the "plausible deniability" of mine-laying or drone launches evaporates.
- Aggressive Sanctions on Flag States: If a ship is flagged in a tax haven but wants U.S. protection, they should pay a "Protection Levy" that covers the actual cost of the SM-2 missiles.
- Accept the Risk: Markets are resilient. When the Strait gets "hot," prices spike, and then supply chains adapt. By trying to smooth out every ripple with a naval hull, we prevent the market from doing the one thing it's good at: pricing in risk and finding alternatives.
The Bessent proposal is a relic. It’s a comfort blanket for a world that no longer exists.
Stop looking at the horizon for the cavalry. The cavalry is too expensive, too slow, and too vulnerable. If we continue to believe that "big ships equals safety," we are setting ourselves up for a naval disaster that will make the 1980s Tanker War look like a minor skirmish.
Get out of the water. Build the pipelines. Tax the flag-of-convenience freeloaders. Let the Navy get back to actual power projection instead of being a glorified towing service for Big Oil.
The era of the naval escort is dead. We just haven't had the funeral yet.
